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Abstract:  
In Britain, levels of political trust have declined, stimulating policy makers to explore ways 
of appealing to discontented citizens. One such initiative involves reform of the political 
system. Yet this raises the question of which types of political reform are likely to appeal to 
discontented citizens. Existing studies have examined how individuals respond to political 
reforms, yet these studies only consider a limited range of institutional changes. Scholars 
and policy makers thus know little about the popular appeal of a wider set of institutional 
reforms. Taking advantage of proposals for political reform in Britain, this article considers 
public reactions to a wide range of institutional changes. Using data from the 2011 British 
Social Attitudes survey, we find that direct democratic reforms are not the only changes that 
appeal to discontented citizens. Instead, policy-makers may also appeal to the distrustful via 
reforms that allow voters more control over their political representatives. 
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One of the most striking features of contemporary British politics is the apparent decline in 
ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ
to the lower levels of political trust among citizens today compared with three or four decades 
ago (Phillips and Simpson, 2015; Jennings et al, 2016; Stoker, 2017: 35-41). Low levels of 
political trust are deemed to have significant effects, including the stimulation of popular 
ȱ ȱ ȁȂȱ ȱ ȁȂȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ (Ford and 
Goodwin, 2014: 187-200; Jennings et al, 2016). Not surprisingly given these effects, mainstream 
politicians and commentators are searching for ways to appeal to disaffected citizens in the 
hope of boosting levels of trust. One such trust-building initiative involves reform of the 
ȱ ¢ǯȱ ȱ ŗşşŝǰȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
reform, often with the goal of improving the way citizens view, and engage with, the political 
system (King, 2009: ch4). In one of the most recent manifestations of this development, the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government that came to office in 2010 suggested 
ȱȂȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȃȄȱȱȱȃȱȱȄȱȱ
put it on a more healthy footing (HM Government, 2010: 26).  
 
The question implicitly raised by the Coalition pledge is whether political reform is likely to 
engage discontented citizens, and if so whether certain types of reform are likely to be more 
successful than others? That levels of political trust among British citizens have continued to 
decline even after the panoply of constitutional changes introduced by successive 
governments since 1997 (Curtice and Seyd, 2012) suggests either that institutional reform by 
itself may be an ineffective way of engaging citizens (Bowler and Donovan, 2013), or that only 
certain types of institutional reform Ȯ going beyond those already introduced in Britain Ȯ are 
likely to engage them. This article is designed to explore the second of these theses. Rather 
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than exploring whether existing institutional changes have re-connected citizens with their 
political rulers, we seek to identify whether different types of institutional change have the 
potential to appeal to distrustful citizens, and if so which among these types hold an especially 
strong appeal. 
 
ȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȁȱȱ	Ȃȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱŘŖŗŖȱ
ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȁȂȱ
model, but many of which anticipated a very different form of politics. Falling within the 
representative category were proposals to change the voting system for national elections via 
a referendum, and to replace the appointed House of Lords with a predominantly elected 
second chamber. New and powerful political offices were also proposed at the local level, in 
the form of mayors and police commissioners, who would be directly elected and thus 
ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ
of politics going well beyond the traditional representative relationship between citizens and 
politicians. Into this category fell proposals allowing citizens to initiate referendums at the 
local level and giving voters greater control over party representatives, through provisions 
for the recall of MPs and for open primaries to select Ȃȱ election candidates. The 
proposed political reforms thus extended well beyond minor tweaks to the existing 
representative model. Instead, they encompassed extending the electoral principle to new 
offices (in the form of mayors and police commissioners), giving voters greater say in policy 
decisions (via referendums), and allowing voters greater rights to select party candidates 
(through open primaries) and to sanction existing MPs (through legislator recall). 
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We should note straightaway that most of these proposals were not introduced; of the reforms 
just identified, the only ones to be implemented were the proposals for directly elected mayors 
and police commissioners and, to a limited degree, for the recall of MPs. Given this, we are 
unable to explore the effects of actually implementing different types of political reform. 
Nonetheless, we can explore what appeal these reforms have for citizens, and in particular for 
citizens who distrust the existing political system.  
 
To date, the empirical literature provides only limited evidence about how citizens evaluate 
different types of political reform. This is not surprising, since only rarely do politicians 
propose radical changes to the operation of national political systems. Yet as a result of the 
far-reaching changes proposed in Britain in 2010, along with their public discussion and 
evaluation, we are better placed to evaluate how citizens view a range of reforms to the 
political system. This provides us with an important insight into whether, if citizens are to be 
re-engaged with the political system, policy makers might need to consider very different 
ways of conducting politics, for example by giving citizens more extensive decision-making 
rights over policy issues and political personnel. Alternatively, however, we might find 
people responding positively to reforms that grant them greater electoral control over public 
officials. If this is the case, effective political reform might not need to extend as far as the 
ȁȱȂȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱextending the electoral principle to local 
and national level political offices.  
 
The article proceeds as follows. In the first section, we review what existing studies tell us 
ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ £Ȃȱ ȱ pport, and 
identify how our analysis contributes to scholarly understanding in this area. The second 
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section describes our analytical approach, and introduces the data on which the analysis rests. 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱudes towards different institutional 
reforms; in doing so, it explores whether people appraise different types of reform in similar 
or distinct ways, and thus whether particular groupings of institutional reform exist in the 
public mind. The fourth section explores the relationship between support for different types 
of reform and levels of trust in the existing political system. We find that, although 
discontented citizens are generally not attracted to political reforms that maintain 
representative arrangements, they do favour some changes within the basic representative 
model. Moreover, distrustful citizens seem just as attracted to institutional changes that give 
them a stronger role in the selection and rejection of political representatives as they do to 
reforms that give them a direct say over policy decisions. 
 
Although our analysis focuses on Britain, many other advanced democracies also face 
declining levels of public trust in the political system and have introduced, or are considering, 
similar types of reform to those proposed in Britain. The implications of our results may thus 
have a reach beyond Britain, in particular in countries where political reform is being 
considered as a way of re-engaging discontented citizens. 
 
Political support and institutional design 
 
Within the existing literature on the relationship between £Ȃȱpolitical support and the 
design of political institutions, two approaches are adopted. The first considers the 
relationship at the aggregate level, exploring whether levels of political support are 
systematically higher or lower in differently configured political systems. These studies have 
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focused in particular on the effects of (i) differently designed electoral systems and (ii) the 
provision of direct democracy. When it comes to electoral systems, studies suggest that 
political support tends to be higher among citizens in countries operating a proportional 
electoral model than among citizens in countries operating a majoritarian model (Lijphart, 
1999; Berrgren et al, 2004; Farrell and McAllister, 2006; Karp and Banducci, 2008; Listhaug et 
al, 2009; Christensen, 2015), although there are some exceptions to this finding (eg. Norris, 
1999; Aarts and Thomassen, 2008).1 When it comes to direct democratic institutions, studies 
suggest that levels of political support are higher where there is more extensive provision for, 
and use of, direct democracy (Bernauer and Vatter, 2012; Persson et al, 2013; Bauer and Fatke, 
2014).  
 
While such cross-unit studies are helpful in identifying the potential effects of different 
institutional forms,2 they tell us little about the relationship between institutional design and 
political support at the individual level.3 Such individual-level evaluations have been pursued 
primarily through single country analyses. A few of these studies have examined how far 
public support for reforming representative arrangements covaries with levels of political 
trust. Analyses of public attitudes to changing the electoral rules have sometimes shown no 
clear link with feelings of political support (Wenzel et al, 2000; Curtice and Seyd, 2011), 
although once reform is introduced it appears to be favoured by those with high levels of 
political support (Karp and Bowler, 2001). Rather more studies have focused on the link 
between political support and direct democratic institutions. These analyses largely 
corroborate the results of the cross-national studies, showing that people with low levels of 
political trust and democratic satisfaction are particularly supportive of direct democracy in 
6 
 
the form of referendums (Donovan and Karp, 2006; Bowler et al, 2007; Parry and Donovan, 
2008; Curtice and Seyd, 2012; Webb, 2013; Allen and Birch, 2015; Schuck and de Vreese, 2015).  
 
However, while these individual-level studies deepen our understanding of how citizens 
evaluate political reforms, they only cover a limited set of institutional changes. Granted, 
recent studies have examined £Ȃȱȱ ȱa wider range of decision-making 
arrangements, iȱ ȱȱ ȁȂȱ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ
allocate a central policy role to unelected experts.4 These studies find that citizens discontented 
with the existing political system tend to respond negatively to institutions that entrench the 
position of elected representatives, and more favourably to reforms that transfer decision-
making authority to unelected experts, or instead to citizens themselves (Bengtsson and 
Mattila, 2009; Webb, 2013; Coffé and Michels, 2014; Font et al, 2015). Even these studies, 
however, limit the range of institutions considered to representative, direct democratic and 
stealth varieties, and do not consider other ways in which political systems might be reformed.  
 
Hence, the evidence about how citizens respond to different ways of reforming the political 
system is not as extensive as it could be, insofar as existing studies focus on a limited range of 
reform options. This is understandable, since it is difficult to ask citizens for their views on 
political reforms that exist only at a hypothetical or abstract level. Since citizens are generally 
found to lack information about how the political system operates (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 
1996: 69-73), any attempts to measure attitudes to hypothetical institutional changes would 
ȱȱȱȁ-Ȃȱ(Converse, 1964; Schumann and Presser, 1980). Yet this 
leaves open the question of how citizens are likely to respond to the kind of institutional 
reforms proposed in Britain. This is an issue not only for domestic policy makers, but also for 
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those in other countries where similar reforms have been introduced. Governments in many 
advanced democracies have, in recent years, introduced a variety of reforms to core political 
structures, often in the hope of appealing to discontented citizens (Cain, Dalton and Scarrow, 
2003; Bedock, Mair and Wilson, 2012; Renwick, 2012; Farrell, 2014). For example, various 
countries in western Europe and beyond have extended the use of directly elected local 
mayors (Scarrow, 2003; Magret and Bertrana, 2007; Steyvers et al, 2008; Bedock, Mair and 
Wilson, 2012) and increased the involvement of citizens in the selection of party candidates 
and leaders (Hazan and Rahat, 2010: ch3; Sandri and Seddone, 2015) and in the recall of 
legislators (Beramendi et al, 2008: ch5; Qvortrup, 2011; Kelly et al, 2014). Given the political 
changes proposed in Britain, and the changes already introduced in other countries, we need 
a clearer understanding of how citizens evaluate these different reforms. 
 
Based on the empirical studies already reviewed, and the wider conceptual and descriptive 
literature on institutional design, we derive various hypotheses about the likely association 
 ȱ £Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ and their support for institutional 
reform. We assume in general that citizens who are discontented with the existing political 
system are more likely to favour its reform than people who are contented. Far more 
interesting, though, is which types of reform are favoured. We anticipate that reforms that 
merely alter the terms of the representative model Ȯ such as changing the electoral system Ȯ 
will hold only a limited appeal for discontented citizens.  
 
Hypothesis 1: There is no substantial positive ȱ ȱ£Ȃȱȱdistrust 
and their support for electoral reform. 
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Notwithstanding this hypothesis, granting citizens greater control over public officials Ȯ 
through direct election of members of the House of Lords and of local mayors and police 
commissioners Ȯ is likely to be more popular among the discontented. In particular, the direct 
election of single-person executive positions like elected mayors is believed to encourage a 
focus on Ȃȱȱqualities and appeals, rather than on party images and labels 
(Scarrow, 2003; Curtice et al, 2008). Since political parties appear to conjure up negative 
impressions among citizens (Dalton and Weldon, 2005), institutional reforms that promote 
personalised, as opposed to party-based, representation might be expected to attract 
distrustful citizens in particular.  
 
Hypothesis 2: ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ£Ȃȱȱdistrust and their 
support for the direct election of existing or new office-holders. 
 
When it comes to citizen voice in policy decisions, a clear finding from the empirical literature 
is that discontented citizens favour instruments of direct democracy such as referendums. We 
anticipate a similar result among our sample. However, we also anticipate that discontented 
citizens who distrust politicians elected under existing institutional rules will respond 
particularly favourably to reforms that give them greater control over party representatives, 
either in the form of open party primaries or the recall of poorly performing legislators.5 
 
Hypothesis 3: ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ£Ȃȱȱȱȱȱ
support for the use of referendums, and also for reforms that give citizens greater control 
over party candidates and legislators. 
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While the focus of our analysis is on the impact of political (dis)trust on support for 
institutional reform, we recognise that trust is not the only factor likely to shape how citizens 
evaluate changes to the political system. Other factors that may shape such support include 
£Ȃȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȁ Ȃȱȱ
ȁȂǯȱWe explain below what effect these factors are likely to have, and how we incorporate 
them into our modelling. 
 
Data 
 
We analyse evaluations of different types of political reform by drawing on a module of 
questions ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ wards the range of reforms 
proposed by the Coalition government, and fielded on the 2011 British Social Attitudes (BSA) 
survey. The BSA survey interviewed face to face a randomly generated sample of British 
adults, with fieldwork taking place between June and October 2011. Overall, 3,311 
respondents were interviewed by the survey, representing a response rate of 54 per cent. 
Among this group, 2,215 respondents were asked a version of the face-to-face questionnaire 
that included the module of questions on institutional reform; some additional questions were 
also fielded on a separate, self-completion, part of the questionnaire (answered by 2,845 
people).  
 
To ȱȂȱȱȱreforms falling within the ȁȂȱǰȱ ȱdraw 
on survey measures tapping attitudes towards changing the electoral system, whether 
respondents voted in favour of changing the electoral system in the referendum on the 
Alternative Vote (AV) in 20116, support for an elected House of Lords over an appointed 
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second chamber, and support for the House of Lords to comprise unelected experts rather 
than party politicians (all question wordings can be found in Appendix 1). To measure 
support for directly elected local offices, we draw on questions that assess attitudes towards 
mayors and police commissioners. To measure attitudes towards reforms that open up 
political parties to citizens, we draw on survey questions asking which group should be 
ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȮ party members, party supporters or all 
local voters Ȯand whether local voters should also be able to ȁȂȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ
breaks the rules or simply performs poorly. Finally, to gauge attitudes towards reforms within 
ȱȁȱticȂȱǰȱ ȱdraw on a number of questions tapping support for the use 
of referendums at both the national and the local levels, on such issues as the electoral system, 
the powers of the European Union, local taxation and the death penalty.7 
 
As previously noted, attempts to gauge public reactions to different types of political reform 
are usually stymied by the hypothetical nature of most of these reforms; citizens will struggle 
to assess institutional changes that have not been introduced or at least extensively discussed 
and evaluated through public debate. Although by the time of the 2011 survey some of the 
reforms proposed by the Coalition Government were still at the planning stage, all had either 
been the subject of public debate or, in some cases (such as elected mayors), had already been 
introduced on a smaller scale by a previous government. This gave us confidence that our 
participants would have at least some knowledge of the reforms they were being asked about. 
Support for this assumption came from a pre-survey pilot exercise that tested Ȃȱ
understanding of the survey questions; this exercise revealed few problems, with interviewers 
reporting little evidence of respondent incomprehension of the survey questions.8 
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We have reported elsewhere on the overall popularity of the institutional reforms proposed 
by the Coalition [citation removed to preserve anonymity]; the marginal distributions are also 
reported in Appendix 1 of this paper. To summarise these results, there is divided public 
support for ȁȂȱǰȱ ȱwidespread opposition to reform of the electoral 
system, yet more public support for moving to an elected House of Lords. Support for directly 
elected mayors and police commissioners varies, while reforms that give citizens greater 
control over elected representatives and greater say in policy decisions are generally popular, 
with only the option of fully open primaries for selecting party candidates attracting modest 
levels of public approval. 
 
How do citizens evaluate political reforms? 
 
Before examining the relationship between political trust and institutional reform, we 
consider the way in which citizens evaluate the proposed reforms. This issue is important 
since it sheds light on whether citizens evaluate different types of reforms in similar ways Ȯ 
suggesting that the reforms are seen to share common purposes or outcomes Ȯ or in distinctive 
ways Ȯ suggesting that the nature and effects of the reforms are seen in more individual or 
discrete terms.  
 
Previous analyses of British citizens have found some overlap in the way people evaluate 
similar types of institutional reform, such as changes to the electoral system (Curtice and 
Jowell, 1998; Fletcher, 2007). Citizens in other West European democracies have also been 
found to evaluate similar types of political institution in consistent ways (Font et al, 2015). We 
therefore have some expectation that attitudes to individual reforms will show some 
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similarities, and not be entirely discrete. However, although we have identified some broad 
distinctions between different types of political reform Ȯ notably between ȁȂȱȱ
ȁȱ Ȃȱ changes Ȯ we do not anticipate these conceptual distinctions mapping 
exactly onto £Ȃȱ  ȱ ǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ a hypothesised 
dimensionality on our data, we instead pursue a more inductive approach by identifying the 
dimensions that emerge from the way citizens evaluate the different reforms.  
 
We do so using Mokken scaling, a technique that allows for the identification of latent 
dimensions that underlie answers to individual survey items (van Schuur, 2003; 2011). These 
latent dimensions, observed in the clustering of survey items, represent a ȱȱȂȱ
attitudes under which each cluster of items comprises reforms that are regarded in a similar 
fashion by respondents. Mokken scaling therefore has a similar purpose to factor analysis, yet 
is a more suitable technique when, as here, the form of the data to be analysed is ordinal rather 
than interval (van der Eijk and Rose, 2015). The reliability of these scales is evaluated using 
ǰȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱǻȱȱǰȱȱȱǰȱŘŖŖřǱȱŗśŘǼǯȱ In 
common with other measures of reliability, rho is strongly related to the number of items 
analysed, and as such scales with few items will have lower reliability, ceteris paribus. 
However, this feature does not undermine the interpretation of the scales as being internally 
consistent measures of a single concept (Sijtsma, 2009: 114-6).  
 
We present the results from the Mokken scale analysis in Table 1.9 The coefficients represent 
the underlying connection between the responses to the individual survey measures and the 
rest of the scale as a whole, and are therefore analogous to factor loadings. It is generally 
accepted that values above 0.3 represent substantively important relationships between the 
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questions at the latent level (van Schuur, 2003: 149). The clearest evidence of consistency in 
the way people evaluate institutional reforms arises in relation to the use of referendums. 
Here, although the survey asked about the use of referendums at both the national and local 
ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ £Ȃȱ
preferences follow a broadly similar pattern irrespective of the character of the referendum. 
Yet our analysis also shows that views on the use of referendums do not reflect the same 
underlying attitude that exists towards other ways of involving the public in decision-making, 
notably via the selection of party candidates or the recall of legislators. Nor do these two types 
of reform themselves attract consistent public evaluations; hence attitudes towards the use of 
open party primaries do not fit within scale 5, which defines evaluations towards the use of 
MP recall. Our analysis thus suggests ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȁȱ Ȃȱ ȱȱ
public mind, but rather different varieties.  
 
The figures in Table 1 also show that attitudes to electoral reform are fairly consistent; but that 
views on this topic are largely unconnected to attitudes towards establishing an elected House 
of Lords. Unlike certain constitutional reform lobby groups, then, the public appears to lack a 
consistent perspective on the virtues of what are sometimes presented as a set of pluralistic or 
consensual political reforms. Public attitudes are also broadly consistent when it comes to 
elected local mayors, and to elected police commissioners. However, as indicated by the 
separate scales underlying ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ Ȃ 
evaluations across the two types of reform. 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
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Overall, the pattern of evaluations suggests that most citizens do not adopt consistent 
attitudes towards the very different types of political reform proposed in Britain. True, people 
are largely consistent in their responses to questions about specific reforms, but those who 
support one particular reform do not necessarily support other, similar, proposals. At least 
when it comes to the changes considered here, our sample of citizens showed little inclination 
to evaluate political reform in generic ways. Instead, evaluations are specific to the particular 
institutional reform that respondents are asked about.  
 
In seeking to identify the structure underlying mass attitudes, the assumption is that any 
observed patterns reflect the character of Ȃȱǰȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱthat attitudes 
are measured. However, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that our results are driven 
at least in part by measurement effects. We recognise that some of our survey indicators tap 
ȱ  ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱǻȃȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ
ȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȂȱǵȄǼǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
Ȃȱ ȱ ǻȃȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ isagree that having an elected mayor makes it 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǵȄǼȱ ǻȱ ¡ȱ ŗǼǯȱ 
 ǰȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ǰȱ  ȱ ȱ little 
relationship between attitudes towards reforms that were asked about in similar ways (eg. 
between mayors and police commissioners), while we still find consistency in attitudes 
towards particular reforms even when our measures are worded in opposite (ie. positive and 
negative) directions. This suggests that the structure to public attitudes we have identified is 
not mainly an artefact of measurementǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱminds.  
 
The appeal of different types of institutional reform 
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Having established how citizens evaluate different types of institutional reform, we now turn 
to examine the factors that shape those evaluations. Our principal objective is to establish, 
among individuals, the relationship between support for various institutional reforms and 
levels of political trust, and thus to identify which types of political reform hold a particular 
appeal for people discontented with the existing political system. However, in exploring 
popular support for political reform, we recognise that discontent is unlikely to be the only 
motivating factor. Various other individual-level features are likely to shape evaluations of 
political reform, of which we focus on three whose role has been highlighted in previous 
studies: cognitive awareness, ideology and governing status. Each of these features may 
¢ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ; they may also mediate the 
relationship of primary interest here, between political trust and institutional reform. 
 
Cognitive engagement theories suggest that higher levels of cognitive capacity are associated 
with demands for direct participation in decision-making, reflecting a greater ability to engage 
with the political process as well as a heightened desire for such engagement (Inglehart, 1997: 
307-15; Dalton, 2014: chs. 3-4). While some empirical studies have upheld the link between 
cognitive capacity and participatory demands (Dalton et al, 2001; Donovan and Karp, 2006; 
Bowler et al, 2007), others have found that support for direct democracy is greater among 
people with low levels of cognitive awareness and political knowledge (Bengtsson and 
Mattila, 2009; Anderson and Goodyear-Grant, 2010; Collingwood, 2012; Allen and Birch, 
2015). Even so, while the direction of its effect may vary, cognitive awareness does seem to 
shape attitudes to political reform, particularly to institutions providing for direct citizen 
participation.  
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Attitudes to political reform are also likely to be shaped by Ȃ ideological values. In 
particular, we might anticipate citizens holding authoritarian values to react more favourably 
than their libertarian counterparts to institutional arrangements that enhance the authority of 
rulers by centralising political power. In the British context at least, this means that citizens 
holding authoritarian values should prefer the majoritarian status quo over reform of these 
arrangements. By contrast, people holding libertarian values might be expected to favour 
reform of these rules, particularly where these increase the representation of minorities (via 
electoral reform, for example) and extend the opportunities for individuals to participate in 
decision making. Alongside authoritarian and libertarian values, support for institutional 
reform might also be shaped by ideology. Opening up political systems to citizen voice is 
often supposed one way of challenging the established political and economic order, and is 
thus often associated with the political left (Von Schoultz, 2015). Empirical studies have 
corroborated this claim, showing higher rates of support for direct democracy among people 
holding left-wing values than among people holding right-wing values (Bengtsson and 
Mattila, 2009). On the other hand, people holding right-wing values might, relative to their 
left-wing counterparts, favour restricting the scope of the state, and thus be inclined to support 
reforms that grant voters greater control over their elected representatives, via legislator 
recall.  
 
Support for reforming the political system is also likely to vary according to the policies of the 
parties that people identify with, and according to whether those parties sit inside or outside 
government. The latter claim is based on the notion that people whose party has ȁ Ȃȱȱ
election are less likely to favour reform of the rules that enabled this victory than people whose 
¢ȱȱȁȂ, who are likely to favour alternative processes through which to make their 
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voices heard (Bowler and Donovan, 2007). At the time of our survey, the incumbent governing 
parties were the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, in coalition. While the policy of the 
Conservative party is generally to maintain traditional forms of political authority, the Liberal 
Democrats generally seek to reform political authority. Hence, only for the Conservative party 
do governing status and party ideology coincide. We therefore refrain from categorising 
£ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁ Ȃȱ ȱ ȁȂ, and instead identify the individual party 
supported by our survey respondents, based on a question tapping party identification.10 Our 
expectation is that support for institutional reform will be lower among Conservative party 
supporters than among supporters of the other parties. 
  
The nature of our dependent variables Ȯ evaluations of various institutional reforms Ȯ follows 
ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱŗǼǯȱȱ ȱȱ
consistent attitudes towards the use of referendums, we aggregate the responses to the seven 
individual items into a single scale tapping support for giving citizens a more direct role in 
policy-making. We also form scales to tap evaluations of elected mayors (three items), elected 
police commissioners, electoral reform and the recall of MPs (each two items). Since, in 
addition, we wish to analyse attitudes towards an elected House of Lords and open party 
primaries, and evaluations of these reforms did not fit into one of the broader attitudinal 
dimensions in Table 1, we also use the single-item measures we have for these two reforms.11  
 
Our models include the following independent variables. Of central concern for us is an 
indicator tapping levels of political trust. This is measured via a set of survey questions on 
how much trust respondents have in the British parliament, politicians and governments. 
Testing with a Mokken scale analysis (see above) showed that the responses to these three 
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questions are strongly related to each other and form a single scale which is also highly 
reliable (H=0.82, rho=0.90), confirming prior research which points to a single dimension 
underpinning levels of trust in different political institutions (Hooghe, 2011; Rose, 2014: ch2). 
We aggregate the responses to the three trust measures into a single scale, ordered so that 
higher values equate to higher distrust. We gauge cognitive awareness through a measure of 
Ȃȱȱ, distinguishing between people educated to below university 
degree level and people educated to degree level and above. To gauge authoritarian values, 
we draw on a set of four indicators designed to tap attitudes towards individual liberty versus 
respect for authority (Evans and Heath, 1995).12 These indicators are added together to form a 
single, reliable, scale (H=0.48, rho=0.74). We gauge left-right ideology through a set of five 
indicators designed to tap attitudes towards economic equality (Evans and Heath, 1995).13 
These indicators are again added together to form a single, reliable, scale (H=0.51, rho=0.82).  
 
Our models also control for demographic attributes found in previous empirical studies (eg. 
Webb, 2013) to be associated with attitudes to democratic processes, namely age, gender and 
social class (for the sake of clarity, the results from these variables are omitted from the table 
below). Our models employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. While this method has 
proven to be effective even where the dependent variable is not measured on an interval-level 
scale (Hellevik, 2009), we also ran the same models using an ordinal logistic function. As 
expected, these results were substantively similar to those obtained from OLS; nonetheless, 
because the results of OLS regressions are more directly meaningful and easier to interpret 
(Hellevik, 2009), we report the OLS models here. We recoded our dependent variables to a 
consistent 0-1 scale (with higher values indicating support for reform); the coefficients for the 
independent variables are thus comparable across different types of institutional reform. 
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The results of our models are shown in Table 2 (descriptive statistics for all the variables in 
the model are presented in Appendix 2). In line with hypothesis 3, we find the use of 
referendums to attract significantly greater favour among those with a low regard for the 
political system than among those with a high regard (as indicated by the positive and 
¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȂȱ Ǽ. But this is not the only set of 
institutional arrangements to attract the support of discontented citizens. People who distrust 
politicians are also more favourable to reforms that allow them to select party representatives 
(via open primaries) and to sanction errant legislators (via legislator recall). Thus, the 
politically discontented are drawn not only to reforms that replace representative 
arrangements with a form of direct democracy; they also welcome reforms that give them a 
greater say in how the representative system operates, again in line with our third hypothesis.  
 
On the other hand, less radical changes appear for the most part to have little appeal for the 
distrustful in particular. This is certainly true of changing the electoral system, which supports 
our first hypothesis. Yet when it comes to reforms that introduce personalised elected offices, 
our results stand contrary to hypothesis 2. Here, our results show that distrust is either 
unrelated to support for political reform (in the case of elected police commissioners) or even 
negatively related to support for reform (in the case of directly elected mayors). However, 
some reforms to the representative model do hold a particular appeal for the distrustful, 
notably when it comes to extending the electoral principle to the House of Lords, where the 
distrustful are more supportive than their trusting counterparts. What these results suggest is 
that people who are already distrustful of politicians embrace reforms that allow them to take 
more policy decisions for themselves, along with reforms that increase their control over 
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existing office-holders, whether via elections or via internal party mechanisms. What they are 
less specifically engaged by, or indeed actively reject, are reforms that establish new tiers of 
office-holder, even when many of these new positions are, as in the case of mayors and police 
commissioners, based on individuals rather than party-dominated groups.  
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
The results also show that distrust is not the only factor associated with support for 
institutional change. People holding authoritarian values oppose institutional reforms that 
disperse political power (through a more proportional electoral system), and favour reforms 
that either concentrate power (in the hands of an elected police commissioner) or redistribute 
power from political elites to citizens (via referendums, legislator recall and open primaries). 
The latter finding contradicts our supposition that authoritarians would be less likely than 
libertarians to favour reforms that grant citizens greater influence in the political process. It 
may well be, however, that authoritarians regard reforms that concentrate political authority 
in a single individual and reforms that grant more extensive decision-making rights to citizens 
themselves in a similar fashion, because both reforms avoid the deliberative role of party 
representatives. People holding right-wing values also oppose reforms that disperse political 
power (through electoral reform or moving to an elected House of Lords) although, as 
anticipated, they are also wary of granting citizens a direct say in policy decisions via 
referendums. However, right-wing values do not appear to be associated with support for 
institutional changes that potentially constrain state activism, for example through legislator 
recall; in fact, the coefficient here is negative, although not statistically significant.  
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When it comes to cognitive awareness, there is little apparent impact on support for the use 
of referendums; our results here fail to confirm either of the competing relationships identified 
in previous studies between education and support for direct democracy. Where cognitive 
awareness does seem to matter is, first, in increasing support for reform of the electoral system 
(Curtice and Jowell, 1998) and, second, in reducing support for opening up the selection of 
party candidates to ordinary citizens. Cognitively aware citizens are not significantly less 
supportive of direct democracy, but they do appear more favourable towards maintaining the 
existing role of members and supporters within political parties. Net of these various factors, 
partisanship mostly has little impact on support for institutional change. The one exception is 
changing the electoral system, where Conservative supporters hold distinctly more negative 
views towards reform than supporters of other parties. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Policy makers in Britain and many other advanced democracies are currently confronted with 
rising levels of citizen discontent and distrust.14 For these actors, reform of the political system 
presents a potential response to this malaise. Our results therefore provide a starting point for 
considering the utility of a diverse set of institutional reforms, likely to be of use for policy 
makers in Britain and further afield.  
 
Based on those results, we suggest that policy makers concerned to appeal to discontented 
citizens may need to embrace some fairly radical options. Institutional reforms that simply 
alter the nature of the representative relationship between citizens and their rulers do not 
appear, for the most part, to appeal specifically to the politically disaffected. Indeed, such 
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reforms might even be counterproductive if they involve creating new sets of political offices. 
Anti-politician sentiment is widespread among British citizens, and reforms based on creating 
yet more elected officials Ȯ even in the name of boosting democratic accountability Ȯ seem to 
have at best a limited positive appeal and at worst a substantially negative appeal. 
 
Of greater attraction to the disaffected are proposals that place more powers directly in 
£Ȃȱ ǯȱThis might involve delegating policy authority to citizens, via the use of 
referendums. But equally appealing to sceptical citizens are reforms to representative 
processes that give voters greater authority over elected officials. Hence, the introduction of 
more direct democracy need not be the only type of political reform capable of attracting 
discontented citizens; reforms that introduce greater citizen voice into the representative 
process may hold similar potential. Either way, however, what does appear to be required is 
for political elites to be willing to give voters a greater direct say, whether over policy 
decisions or over the selection and control of elected representatives. 
 
We do not wish to over-extend our claims about the potential effects of institutional reform 
on citizen engagement. For a start, any reforms designed to engage citizens must be both 
popular across the population as a whole and of particular appeal to people who distrust the 
existing political system. As we have shown, many of the reforms proposed in Britain fail to 
meet these twin conditions. In addition, levels of political support may depend less on the 
particular institutional regime in place than on the outcomes to which these institutions give 
rise (Thomassen, 2014), or indeed to a wider set of factors that are largely unrelated to the 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ǻ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ŘŖŗřǱȱ ŞǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ
political reform is to contribute to the goal of citizen engagement, and particularly if it is to 
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engage the distrustful, we suggest that these reforms need to go beyond changing the electoral 
rules or creating additional tiers of elected officials. Instead, a more radical set of reforms may 
be needed, giving voters a greater say, not only in how policy decisions are taken, but also in 
how political representatives are elected and ejected.  
 
Since 2010, however, British governments appear to have lost their appetite for radical reform 
of the political system. The Conservative party dropped its own proposal for open party 
primaries (Alexandre-Collier, 2016), watered down the terms on which MPs could be 
recalled15 and indicated in its 2015 election manifesto that an elected House of Lords was no 
longer a priority. Moreover, following the Brexit referendum in 2016, it is difficult to foresee 
governments of any party readily resorting to referendums to resolve important policy issues. 
Yet by ignoring such radical reforms to the political system, British governments might be 
depriving themselves of one potential way of re-engaging discontented citizens. 
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Table 1: Mokken analysis, showing relationship of items within clusters  
 
 Scale 1 Scale 2 Scale 3 Scale 4 Scale 5 Not part of 
wider scale 
       
Mayors make it easier to get things done 0.58      
Mayors give too much power to one person* 0.41      
Mayors mean there is someone to speak up for the area 0.52      
Referendum needed before councils set large tax rises  0.33     
Referendums on issues of local concern  0.32     
Referendum to decide on death penalty  0.39     
Referendum to decide on electoral system  0.31     
Referendum to decide on giving more power to EU  0.37     
Referendum on moving to elected local mayors  0.43     
Referendum on level of local taxes  0.48     
Police commissioners would ensure a focus on crime   0.52    
Police commissioners would politicise the police*   0.52    
Favour changing the electoral system    0.61   
Supported AV voting system at the referendum    0.61   
Favour allowing voters to force resignation of rule-breaking MPs     0.46  
Favour allowing voters to force resignation of poorly performing MPs     0.46  
       
Favour the Lords being elected not appointed      - 
Lords to consist of independent experts, not party politicians      - 
Who should select party election candidates      - 
       
rho 0.70 0.73 0.65 0.73 0.55  
n 2077 1268 2089 1082 2159  
       
Figures represent Hi coefficients. 
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* Coding for this item is reversed.  
Note that each of these scales also meets the assumption of monotone homogeneity when using the cut-off of crit values greater than 80. 
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Table 2: Models of support for different types of institutional reform 
 Electoral 
reform 
Elected House 
of Lords 
 Elected 
mayors 
Elected police 
commissioners 
 MP recall Open 
primaries 
 Referendums 
           
Distrust 0.02 (.02) 0.04 (.01)**  -0.04 (.01)** 0.01 (.01)  0.05 (.01)** 0.05 (.02)**  0.05 (.01)** 
           
Cognitive awareness 0.09 (.03)** -0.03 (.02)  0.01 (.01) -0.02 (.02)  0.01 (.01) -0.07 (.03)*  -0.02 (.02) 
ǻŖƽǀǰȱŗƽǃǼȱ           
           
Authoritarian values -0.11 (.02)** -0.00 (.01)  0.01 (.01) 0.04 (.01)**  0.03 (.01)** 0.08 (.02)**  0.10 (.01)** 
           
Rightwing ideology -0.10 (.02)** -0.04 (.01)**  0.01 (.01) -0.01 (.01)  -0.01 (.01) -0.03 (.02)  -0.04 (.01)** 
           
Party identification           
   (Conservative)           
   Labour 0.09 (.04)* 0.03 (.02)  0.01 (.01) -0.01 (.02)  -0.00 (.01) 0.02 (.03)  -0.01 (.02) 
   Liberal Democrat 0.27 (.05)** 0.07 (.03)*  0.02 (.02) -0.03 (.03)  0.00 (.02) -0.06 (.04)  -0.00 (.03) 
   Green/Other party 0.20 (.05)** 0.04 (.03)  0.00 (.02) -0.01 (.02)  -0.00 (.02) -0.05 (.05)  0.04 (.03) 
   None 0.05 (.07) 0.01(.03)  0.02 (.02) -0.01 (.02)  -0.03 (.02)* 0.06 (.04)  -0.03 (.03) 
           
F ratio  
(prob > F) 
16.31 
(p<0.001) 
3.48 
(p<0.001) 
 4.30 
(p<0.001) 
5.24  
(p<0.001) 
 6.14 
(p<0.001) 
9.74 
(p<0.001) 
 13.38 
(p<0.001) 
R2 0.27 0.05  0.06 0.08  0.09 0.13  0.17 
N (weighted) 799 1370  1434 1440  1474 1213  1354 
           
ȱȱȂȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱincluded in models, but the results are not shown here. 
Attitudes to each institutional reform are coded on a 0-ŗȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȂȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ
missing. 
ȘȘǂŖǯŖŗȱȘǂŖǯŖśǲ two-tailed tests.
 
Appendix 1: Question wordings and response distributions 
 
Weights 
Data are weighted 
 
Codings 
ȁ-ȂȱȱȱȱȱǱȱȱ¢ȱƽŗǰȱȱƽȱŘǰȱ
Neither = 3, Agree = 4, Agree strongly =5. 
All other response codings are listed below. 
 
ȁȂȱ 
(Q1) Some people say we should change the voting system for general elections to the UK 
House of Commons to allow smaller political parties to get a fairer share of MPs. Others say 
that we should keep the voting system for the House of Commons as it is to produce 
effective government. Which view comes closer to your own?  
Change the voting system for the House of Commons as it is: 66%; change it: 27% (Ȃȱ
know: 7%) 
 
(Q2) In the May 5th referendum you were asked, 'At present, the UK uses the 'first past the 
post' system to elect MPs to the House of Commons. Should the 'alternative vote' system be 
used instead?' Did you vote:  
No, against the Alternative Vote: 68%; Yes, in favour of the Alternative Vote: 29% (Ȃȱ
know: 3%) 
 
Codings for Q1-Q2: against reform = 0, favour reform = 1 
 
(Q3) Some people say that having appointed members brings valuable expertise to the 
House of Lords. Other people argue that members of the House of Lords should be elected 
for it to be democratic. Which of the statements on this card comes closest to your view?  
All members of the House of Lords should be appointed: 9% (coded 1) 
Most members of the House of Lords should be appointed: 7% 
Roughly equal numbers should be appointed and elected: 30% 
Most members of the House of Lords should be elected: 16% 
All members of the House of Lords should be elected: 28% (coded 5) 
Ȃȱ ǱȱŗŗƖ 
 
(Q4) The House of Lords should consist of independent experts, not party politicians 
Disagree strongly: 1%; Disagree: 6%; Neither agree nor disagree: 28%; Agree: 39%; Agree 
¢ǱȱŗŝƖȱǻȂȱ ǱȱşƖǼ 
 
Directly elected local officials 
Some towns and cities have a Mayor who is elected by all the people in the area and who 
has the power to take some decisions on behalf of the local council. From what you have 
seen or heard, how much do you agree or disagree that: 
 
ǻśǼȱǳ having an elected Mayor makes it easier to get things done? 
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Disagree strongly: 2%; Disagree: 18%; Neither agree nor disagree: 38%; Agree: 34%; Agree 
strongly: 2% (Ȃȱ ǱȱŚƖ) 
 
(Q6) ... having an elected Mayor gives too much power to one person? 
Disagree strongly: 1%; Disagree: 26%; Neither agree nor disagree: 35%; Agree: 31%; Agree 
strongly: 4% (Ȃȱ ǱȱŚƖ) 
 
(Q7) ... having an elected Mayor means there is always someone who can speak up for the 
whole area? 
Disagree strongly: 1%; Disagree: 14%; Neither agree nor disagree: 23%; Agree: 55%; Agree 
strongly: 3% (Ȃȱ Ǳȱ3%) 
 
It has been suggested that every police force should be headed by a commissioner who is 
elected by all the people in the area and who would be responsible for setting priorities for 
how the area is policed. Please say how much you agree or disagree that having locally 
elected police commissioners would ... 
 
(Q8) ... ensure the police concentrated on tackling those crimes that most concern ordinary 
people? 
Disagree strongly: 3%; Disagree: 13%; Neither agree nor disagree: 15%; Agree: 54%; Agree 
strongly: 11% (Ȃȱ Ǳȱ3%) 
 
(Q9) ... result in too much political interference in the way the police do their job? 
Disagree strongly: 1%; Disagree: 29%; Neither agree nor disagree: 28%; Agree: 33%; Agree 
strongly: 5% (Ȃȱ ǱȱŚƖ) 
 
Party representative reforms 
It has been suggested that sometimes voters should be able to force their local MP to resign 
and fight a by-election.  
 
(Q10) First of all, say that the MP has broken the rules. How much do you agree or disagree 
that in those circumstances voters should be able to force their MP to resign? 
Disagree strongly: 0%; Disagree: 3%; Neither agree nor disagree: 7%; Agree: 53%; Agree 
strongly: řśƖȱǻȂȱ ǱȱŘ%) 
 
(Q11) And what if the MP had not broken any rules, but voters thought he or she was not 
doing a very good job? Should voters be able to force their MP to resign?  
Disagree strongly: 1%; Disagree: 22%; Neither agree nor disagree: 17%; Agree: 47%; Agree 
strongly: 11% (Ȃȱ Ǳȱ2%) 
 
(Q12) Before each general election, each of the political parties has to choose someone as 
their candidate to be the local MP. Who do you think should have a say in deciding who 
ȱȱȱ¢ȂȱǵȱȱȱǱ 
Only those who are paid-up members of the party locally: 23% (coded 0) 
All those locally who usually vote for the party: 28% (coded 0.5) 
Everyone in the constituency, whether they usually vote for the party or not: 29% (coded 1) 
(CȂȱǱȱŘŖƖ) 
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ȁ democracyȂȱ 
Here are some decisions that could be made either by the MPs we elect to Parliament or by 
everyone having a say in a special vote or referendum. Who do you think should make the 
decision about: 
 
(Q13) ǳȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǵȱ 
Elected MPs in Parliament: 22%; Everyone in a referendum: 61% (ȂȱȦȱ
answered: 18%) 
 
(Q14) ǳȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱ 
Elected MPs in Parliament: 16%; Everyone in a referendum: 69% (ȂȱȦȱ
answered: 15%) 
 
(Q15) ǳȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ 
Elected MPs in Parliament: 19%; Everyone in a referendum: 67% (ȂȱȦȱ
answered: 14%) 
 
(Q16)ǳȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ 
Elected MPs in Parliament: 10%; Everyone in a referendum: 76%ǲȱǻȂȱȦȱ
answered: 14%) 
 
(Q17) Decisions about the level of the council tax in your area could be made either by your 
elected local council or by everyone locally having a say in a special vote or referendum. 
Should the decision about council tax be made: 
By your elected local council: 52%; By everyone in a referendum: 43% (Ȃȱ ǱȱśƖ) 
 
Codings for Q13-Q17: elected MPs/council = 0, everyone = 1 
 
(Q18) A council that wants to increase the council tax by more than inflation should have to 
get a majority vote in favour through a local referendum 
Disagree strongly: 3%; Disagree: 11%; Neither agree nor disagree: 13%; Agree: 42%; Agree 
strongly: 2ŚƖȱǻȂȱȦȱ : 6%) 
 
(Q19) People should be able to insist that their local council holds a special vote or 
referendum on any issue about which there is a lot of local concern 
Disagree strongly: 2%; Disagree: 9%; Neither agree nor disagree: 16%; Agree: 48%; Agree 
strongly: ŗşƖȱǻȂȱȦȱ ǱȱŜƖǼ 
 
To ensure consistent variable codings for Q18-Q19 and Q13-Q17, the response categories for 
Q18-Q19 were recoded into: disagree strongly/disagree/neither = 0, agree/agree strongly = 1 
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Appendix 2: Coding and descriptive statistics for variables in Table 2. 
 
  Min Max Mean SD N 
Dependent variables      
Support for electoral reform      
Scale of responses to questions 1 and 2 (see Appendix 1). Scale runs 0 (against change to the 
electoral system and voted against AV), 0.5 (either support change to electoral system or voted for 
AV) and 1 (support change to electoral system and voted for AV). 
 0 1 0.27 0.40 1082 
Support for elected House of Lords      
Question 3 (0=favour appointed membership to 1=favour elected membership) 
  0 1 0.63 0.32 1925 
Support for elected mayors      
Scale of responses to questions 5, 6 (coding reversed) and 7. Scale runs 0 (disagree mayors having 
beneficial effects) to 1 (agree mayors having beneficial effects) 
 0 1 0.54 0.17 2077 
Support for elected police commissioners      
Scale of responses to questions 8 and 9 (coding reversed). Scale runs 0 (disagree commissioners 
having beneficial effects) to 1 (agree commissioners having beneficial effects) 
  0 1 0.55 0.20 2089 
Support for politician recall      
Scale of responses to questions 10 and 11. Scale runs from 0 (reject recall) to 1 (support recall). 
 0 1 0.71 0.17 2159 
Support for open primaries      
Question 12 (0=choice made by party members, 0.5=local voters, 1=all constituents) 
 0 1 0.54 0.40 1523 
Support for direct democracy      
Scale of responses to seven questions: Q13 to Q19. Scale runs 0 (prefer representatives to take 
decisions) to 1 (prefer citizens to take decisions). 
 0 1 0.75 0.27 1687 
Explanatory variables      
Feelings about existing political system 
Measured through scale of responses to questions on trust in parliament, politicians and 
governments in Britain. Scale runs from 1 (high trust) to 5 (low trust). 
 1 5 3.53 0.83 2164 
Cognitive awareness  
Measured through question on educational qualifications (0= ǀ¢ȱǰȱŗƽȱǃ¢ȱ
level) 
 0 1 0.32 0.47 3002 
Authoritarian values  
Measured through scale of responses to four statements (1=libertarian, 5=authoritarian) 
 1 5 3.94 0.72 2793 
Ideological values  
Measured through scale of responses to five statements (1=left values, 5=right values) 
 1 5 2.58 0.74 2758 
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1 In addition, other analyses have found levels of political support to be highest where electoral 
systems are either very proportional or very disproportional (Marien, 2011). 
2 Although whether variations in institutional design are themselves responsible for variations in 
political support among citizens is debatable; there is always the suspicion that unobserved variation 
between units influences observed variation in political support. 
3 Some comparative analyses use a multi-level approach, to explore the effects on trust of both 
system-level and individual-level factors; for example, Van der Meer (2010). 
4 ȱȱȱ¡ȱ£Ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
(Ferrin and Kriesi, 2016). In this article, our focȱȱȱ£Ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱ
than to more general democratic principles and practices. 
5 The popular appeal of these sets of reform has not been extensively studied. Among the very limited 
evidence base, one study that does provide clues as to likely public responses concerns legislative 
term limits, support for which was found to be concentrated among citizens discontented with the 
existing political system (Karp, 1995). 
6 The AV referendum took place across the United Kingdom in May 2011, with 32 per cent voting for 
AV and 68 per cent opting to retain the existing single member plurality system. 
7 Note that the Coalition Agreement in 2010 contained no promise to hold a referendum on the death 
penalty, although we would nonetheless expect voters to be familiar with the issues raised by such a 
referendum. 
8 ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȁȂȱ Ȃȱȱȱ
survey questions (listed in Appendix 1). On questions with an explicit ȁȂ  Ȃȱȱǰȱ
the maximum proportion of respondents selecting this option was 11 per cent. 
9 Because Mokken scaling requires the use of listwise deletion of cases with missing values, which 
sharply reduces the number of cases available for analysis, we conducted the analysis in two steps. 
First, we ran a general clustering analysis on all nineteen of the indicators of support for the 
institutional reforms (see Appendix 1) to determine which dimensions defined attitudes to each of 
these reforms, using the standard cut-off of 0.3 for assessing substantively important connections 
(n=616; analysis not shown here). Second, and having determined the identity of these dimensions, 
we assessed the fit of each survey item with its relevant dimension (shown in Table 1). The results 
obtained are substantively similar to those obtained by factor analysis of all pairwise complete 
observations, although as expected given that we analyse ordinal data the factor analysis results have 
a tendency to over-dimensionalise (see van der Eijk and Rose, 2015).  
10 There was no question on the BSA for recalled vote choice. 
11 Distributions on each of these measures are set out in Appendix 2. Confirming the results obtained 
from the Mokken scale analysis, the inter-relationships between the measures are modest. Only 
attitudes towards the use of referendums and voter recall of MPs (correlation of 0.28, p<0.01) and 
towards referendums and the use of open party primaries (0.29, p<0.01) achieve even a modest 
ȱȱȂȱǯȱ ǰȱ-relations between attitudes to the various types of 
political reform are low. 
12 ȱȱ Ǳȱȃȱȱ¢ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȄǰȱ
ȃȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȄǰȱȃȱȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱȱȱȄǰȱȱȃȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢Ȅǯȱȱ
were recorded on a 1-5 agree-disagree scale. Two additional items often found (Evans and Heath, 
1995) to load onto the liberty-¢ȱȱǻȃȱ ȱȱ ¢ȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱ
 ȱȱ Ȅȱȱȃȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȄǼȱ
were found not to load strongly onto the scale, and were thus dropped. 
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13 ȱȱ Ǳȱȃ	ȱȱȱȱȱȱ-off to those who are 
less weȱȄǰȱȃȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ Ȅǰȱȃ¢ȱ ȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ Ȅǰȱȃȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȄȱ
ȱȃȱ ȱ ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȄǯȱȱ
were recorded on a 1-5 agree-disagree scale. 
14 Although increasing distrust is by no means a feature in all advanced democracies; see Norris 
(2011): chapter 4. 
15 The Recall of MPs Act 2015 lodged the power to trigger a recall petition with parliament (in the office 
of the House of Commons Speaker) rather than with local voters. 
